Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1971

Kjeld Victorio Guglielmetti v. John W. Turner,
Warden, Utah State Prison : Respondent's Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Larry V. Lunt; Attorney for Defendant-RespondentGalen Ross; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Guglielmetti v. Turner, No. 12600 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3172

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STAE OF UTAH'····{;~.
.''

..

i

WA WCOORIO GUGL~,:·:
Plaintiff

w.-..

'VIL

.

JOHN W. TURNER,
Stam Prison, Defendtli}.t~li)es.·t,_·. .
·~

GALEN ROSS
781 East South Templ,e
Salt Lab City, Ut.ah .

jr

Attorney for Appellant

I

'

;.

J

·...

~'

'
~

•·.. -'."'i'i;

- '

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COuRT ______________

1
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS---------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
POINT I. GUGLIELMETTI VOLUNTARILY
AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA, WHICH THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS, AND GUGLIELMETTI
HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY HIS PETITION WAS INCORRECT ------------------------------------ 2
POINT II. GUGLIELMETTI'S CONTENTION
THAT THE SENTENCING JUDGE WAS
UNAWARE HE COULD GRANT PROBATION TO GUGLIELMETI'I IS WITHOUT
MERIT IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD WHICH COMPELS THE SPECIFIC FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
REJECTING THIS CONTENTION ------------------ 11
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 12
CASES CITED

United States Supreme Court
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23
L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) ------------------------------------------------ 3
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441,
25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970) -------------------------------------------- 7, 9
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) -------------·-------·--------·---·------·-· 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 90 S. Ct.
1474, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970) -------------------------------- 3
United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463,
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) ------------------------------------------

8

State Cases
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968 (1968)
Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P. 2d 901
(1970) -------------------------------------------------------------------------Kryger v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 479 P. 2d 477
(1971) -------------------------------------------------------------------------Larabee v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 248, 480 P. 2d 134
(1971) -------------------------------------------------------------------------Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 435 P. 2d 287
(1967) -------------------------------------------------------------------------Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323
(1969} --------------------------------------------------------------------------

3
4
9

4

4
8

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13a-2 (1953) --------------------------------

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953) -------------------------------- 11

IN THE
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JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

12600

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the denial of the petition of
Kjeld Victorio Gulgielmetti, for a writ of habeas corpus,
and the order thereof.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Kjeld Victorio Guglielmetti was charged with two
separate counts of unlawfully selling a narcotic drug,
to-wit: Cannabis Sativa, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-13a-2 (1953). The appellant pied guilty to one charge
(the other charge was dismissed) and Guglielmetti was

sentenced to serve the indeterminate term as provided
by law for the offense. Guglielmetti petitioned the Third
District Court for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied. This appeal
is from said order of the Court denying the petition.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State submits that the decision of the District
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State adopts Guglielmetti's Statement of Facts,
except as hereinafter set forth.
The appellant, Guglielmetti was not nineteen years
old as alleged in his brief but was twenty-four years old
at the time he entered his plea.
Further, there is no evidence except for the unsupported allegations of the appellant to suggest that the
appellant was ignorant of the possible prison sentence he
could receive for selling a narcotic drug, but there is evidence showing that Guglielmetti thoroughly discussed the
matter with his attorney and was aware of the possibility
of a prison sentence for the felony (R. 29, 30).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
GUGLIELMETTI VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY ENTERED A GU IL TY
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PLEA, WHICH THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS, AND GUGLIELMETTI
HAS FAILED TO SHOW THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION TO DENY HIS PETITION WAS INCORRECT.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly held
that before a state accepts a guilty plea, the court must
determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S.
Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 1474, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970),
and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160,
27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). Further, the record must affirmatively show that the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, see Boykin v. Alabama, supra. On these requirements the state fully agrees with Guglielmetti.
However, the State disagrees with Guglielmetti's contention that there is insufficient information in the transcript of hls arraignment to affirmatively show that his
guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and
the State asserts that the denial of his writ by the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, was correct.
It is important to note that a habeas corpus proceeding is a civil matter and the trial court's findings are presumed to be correct on appeal and evidence is to be surveyed in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment. See, Brown v. Turner, 21 U. 2d 96,
440 P. 2d 968 (1968), Maxwell v. Turner, 20 U. 2d 163,
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435 P. 2d 287 (1967). The trial court had a full hearing
and Guglielmetti had his opportunity to present his evidence to show his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Utah law is also clear that at trial the
petitioner has the burden to prove facts which will entitle
him to relief. See, Larrabee v. Turner, 25 U. 2d 248, 480
P. 2d 134 (1971) and Johnson v. Turner, 24 U. 2d 439,
473 P. 2d 901 (1970). After Guglielmetti's hearing the
trial court made, inter alia, these specific findings:
"5. There is no evidence that petitioner's
withdrawal of his plea of not guilty or his entrance
of a guilty plea was not voluntary (sic) and understandingly made.
6. Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden
of proof in support of his contention that his guilty
plea was not voluntary (sic) and understandingly
entered."
In examining the record, the state asserts that the
transcript of Guglielmetti's arraignment affirmatively
shows his plea was freely entered and is sufficient evi.depce to justify the denial of his writ of habeas corpus
by the trial court.
Guglielmetti had two charges of unlawful sale of a
narcotic drug pending against him. The defendant with
the advice of his attorney desired to change his plea from
not guilty to guilty, and before accepting his guilty plea,
Guglielmetti's attorney asked his client several questions
which affirmatively show that Guglielmetti voluntarily
and intelligently changed his plea:
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"THE COURT: The record may show that
the defendant, Kjeld Victorio Guglielmetti, is
present, and that the case is set for trial this
morning: Number 22607, that he is represented
by his attorney Sumner J. Hatch; that the State
is represented by Richard Shepherd; that there
is also another case pending, Case Number 22608
on another charge of unlawfully selling a narcotic
drug. And the record may also show that we have
a jury and are ready for trial on the 22607.
Do you have some other disposition that you
wish to make?
MR. HATCH: I would like to make a record
before we do.
I understand, Mr. Guglielmetti, that both of
these charges, that you are charged with sale of a
narcotic drug, to-wit: cannabis sativa, marijuana.
One being charged on May 4th, and one being
charged on May the 26th; both being charges of
sale to one Ronald Baker. Do you understand
that?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes.
MR. HATCH: Do you understand, though,
that the charges you are charged with under our
present law are felonies?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Right.
MR. HATCH: And conviction, or plea of
guilty to either, or to both could result in your
incarceration in the State Prison?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Right.
MR. HATCH: And you also understand that
the Court has some discretion in this matter in a
probationary basis as to probation and condition?
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Now, as has been indicated the State on a
plea of guilty to one of the charges, would
willing to move the Court to dismiss the other charge
which is discretionary of the Court. Do you un~
derstand that?

be

MR. GUGLIELME'I'TI: Yes.
MR. HATCH: You and I have talked the
matter over thoroughly together on the matter of
the type of disposition, is that correct?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes.
MR. HATCH: And is it your desire to change
your plea with regard to the sale that is alleged
to have been made to Ronald Baker on the 4th
day of May of 1970?
MR. GUGLIELME'I'TI: Yes, I am.
MR. HATCH: Do you understand that there
are no promises, and we could make no promises
of what the Judge would do in the way of sentencing? It's entirely within his discretion?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes.
MR. HATCH: Is there anything more the
Court feels he should be advised of?
THE COURT: I think not. On the charge of
Case Number 22608 we have heretofore entered a
plea of not guilty. Do you withdraw that plea?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you enter a plea of
guilty to that charge?
MR. GUGLIELMETTI: Yes.
THE COURT: The plea of guilty is entered"
(See R. 28, 29). (Emphasis added.)
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Guglielmetti knew that he was pleading guilty to a
felony which could result in his incarceration in the State
Prison (R. 28) and he admitted that he had thoroughly
discussed the matter with his attorney before entering
his plea of guilty (R. 29). This is amply shown in the
record and from this evidence it is clear that his plea was
intelligently entered.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that when an accused is represented by a competent attorney and upon the advice of his counsel pleads guilty,
the plea is deemed to be intelligently entered even if
counsel may have misjudged the strength of the prosecution's case. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 90
S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970).
Guglielmetti also answered that it was his desire to
change his plea to guilty and admitted that no promises
were being made to him (R. 29). There is no evidence
suggesting that Guglielmetti's plea was involuntary, but
the appellant asserts that plea bargaining by the prosecutor extirpates the voluntariness of his plea.
Guglielmetti was charged with two separate crimes,
one committed on May 4, 1970 and the other committed
on May 26, 1970. The offense committed on May 26, 1970
involved a much larger quantity ($3,000 worth) (R. 24)
of narcotic drugs than did the offense committed on May
4, 1970. It seems apparent that after reviewing the evidence against him, Guglielmetti felt his best strategy
would be to plead guilty to the one charge with the knowledge that the state would move to dismiss the other
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charge. (The court subsequently dismissed the second
charge) (R. 30). Apparently Guglielmetti and his counsel believed that he had a good chance to be put on probation (see R. 28) rather than sentenced, so in view o!
all the circumstances and with the advice of his counsel
'
Guglielmetti elected to change his plea to guilty.
After receiving a report from the Adult Probation
and Parole Department the trial court sentenced Guglielmetti to the indeterminate sentence as provided by law
(R. 25) rnther than placing him on probation as Guglielmetti and his attorney had hoped the court would do.
Courts have recognized that plea bargaining is a com·
mon and an acceptable practice in criminal law. In
United States v. Brady, 397 U. S. 742, 753, 90 S. Ct. 1463,
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) the Court said:
" ... But we cannot hold that it is unconsti·
tutional for the State to extend a benefit to a
defendant who in turn extends a substantial bene·
fit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime
and to enter the correctional system in a frame of
mind that affords hope for success in rehabilita·
tion over a shorter period of time than might other·
wise be necessary."
The Utah Supreme Court has also considered whether
a plea is voluntarily made when a defendant with multiple
charges against him enters a plea of guilty which results
in the other charges being dismissed. In Strong v. Turner,
22 Utah 2d 294, 296, 452 P. 2d 323 (1969) the court
stated:
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"... the mere fact that a defendant, against

w~om there are multiple charges pending, pleads

guilty to one of them on the condition that the
others be dropped certainly does not in and of
itself compel a finding of coercion."

It is clear that plea bargaining is a legal option available to a prosecutor and an accused, and the mere fact
that one pleads guilty with the promise of the state's
motion to dismiss other charges does not render a guilty
plea involuntary.
It is conceded that both Guglielmetti and his at-

torney were hopeful that he would be placed on probation rather than receive a prison sentence, but the record
affirmatively shows that Guglielmetti's attorney, Mr.
Hatch, advised the defendant that a plea of guilty could
result in a prison sentence and that probation was solely
within the discretion of the trial court and that no promise had been made or could be made on what the judge
would do in the way of sentencing (R. 28, 29). With
this in mind Guglielmetti plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced. The fact that the defendant, and his
attorney had overestimated his chances for probation and
were disappointed when a prison term was prescribed
cannot now be used to thwart a voluntary plea, unless
the advice of his counsel was so incompetent as to amount
to gross error. See McMann v. Richardson, supra, and
Kryger v. Turner, 25 U. 2d 214, 479 P. 2d 477 (1971).
Surely the record demonstrates that no promise of probation was received and the advice given to the defendant
that probation is in the discretion of the trial court was

10

factually true and is not misleading or incompetent. The
appellant has utterly failed to show in what regard the
mentioning of probation, with the accompanying explanation, prejudiced or reduced the voluntary nature of Im
plea..
The appellant appears to assert that the failure of
the trial court to mention the maximum and minimum
terms provided by law for a guilty plea is so prejudicial
that a guilty plea cannot be deemed to be voluntary in
their absence. While the record does not specifically men·
tion the maximum and minimum terms for selling nar·
cotic drugs, the record does disclose that Guglielmetti was
advised that his guilty plea could result in a prison sen·
tence (R. 28), the record also discloses that Guglielmetti
knew he was pleading guilty to a felony (R. 28), and the
record further discloses that Guglielmetti had thoroughly
discussed the disposition of the matter with his attorney
(R. 29) . There is more than adequate evidence to thus
uphold the trial court's finding that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, and except for the appellant's assertion, there is no evidence suggesting that he
was ignorant of the length of the prison term for this
offense. In view of the extensive experience of his attorney and of the admissions in the record that he had
thoroughly discussed the matter and that he knew he
was pleading guilty to a felony which could result in a
prison sentence the trial court was justified in its findings,
and there is no reason to reverse their decision on appeal.

11
POINT IL
GUGLIELMETTI'S CONTENTION THAT
THE SENTENCING JUDGE WAS UNAWARE HE COULD GRANT PROBATION
TO GUGLIELMETTI IS WITHOUT MERIT
IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WHICH JUSTIFIED THE SPECIFIC
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT REJECTING THIS CONTENTION.
As has been previously noted the burden of proving
facts sufficient t.o issue a writ of habeas corpus is upon
the petitioner, and when the trial court denies a petition
its findings are presumed t.o be correct.
After a full hearing the trial court made the following finding of fact:
"7. There is no evidence that the sentencing
judge was unaware of the fact that he could grant
the petitioner probation or that the sentencing
judge desired t.o or would have granted such probation."
Under Utah law the trial court has the discretion to
grant probation where "it appears compatible with the
public interest." See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953).
After pleading "guilty" Guglielmetti agreed t.o waive his
right t.o be sentenced within ten days in order that a report from the Adult Probation and Parole Department be
prepared (R. 30). At sentencing, counsel for Guglielmetti
appealed to the court t.o disregard what he must have
felt t.o be a derogat.ory report (see R. 29). The court
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indicated it examined the report (R. 25) and the court at
no place indicated it felt probation should be granted.
There is no evidence suggesting the trial court was under
misapprehension that it could not grant probation if it
so desired, but rather the record indicates that the court
did not feel probation should be granted in view of the
Adult Probation and Parole report (R. 24, 25).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully submits that Guglielmetti had
a full opportunity to prove the allegedly unconstitutional
entry of his guilty plea in the court below and following
a full hearing his petition was denied. On appeal Gugliel·
metti has failed to show error on the part of the district
court. Accordingly it is urged that the district court's
decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

